Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is a theory of liability that has been most extensively elaborated on by the prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Although JCE has several forms, it essentially requires the prosecution to prove: that a group of people had a common plan, design, or purpose to commit a crime, that the defendant participated in some way in the plan and that the defendant intended the aim of the common plan. If the prosecution proves these elements, the accused can be convicted of all completed crimes within the scope of the common plan, as well as all crimes that he did not intend but that were a foreseeable consequence of the common plan.
While the recent ICTY jurisprudence shows a strong devotion to the use of this form of individual liability 1 , domestic war crime trials seem to maintain a high level of criticism towards its adoption and application as being quite vague, unclear, open to many interpretations and predisposed to abuses.
There are many arguments for and against JCE. The aim of this article is not to argue any, but to provide the reader with basic information on its historical origins, key elements and modes as developed in recent ICTY jurisprudence, as well as dilemmas that have arisen in regard to its concrete application.
Historical Development of Joint Criminal Enterprise
In its short formal existence 2 a variety of legal forums 3 have applied this form of liability and all these proceedings share one important principle: each relies-at least in part-on international criminal law as its source of substantive law. While domestic trials usually also include charges drawn from domestic criminal codes, all of the major ad hoc tribunals include within their jurisdiction crimes and institutes that exclusively originate from international customary law and subsequently from their codifications. Contemporary international criminal law is a complex body of law developed from the civil and common law systems of criminal adjudication, strongly influenced by human rights law and most importantly by domestic criminal codes. Domestic criminal laws regularly focus on individual wrongdoing as a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of criminal punishment. In national legal systems this principle is laid down in Constitutions, in statutes, or in judicial decisions. Similarly, international criminal adjudication has reinforced the principle of individual, personal culpability opposed to the collective guilt notion and reiterated that "nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa) 4 ". Due to that shared principle, many argue that the notion of common purpose upheld in international criminal law has its foundation in many national systems 5 . a) Post World War II case law: The first traces of JCE in the customary international law are identified in the post-World War II cases in which the doctrine was used under different (common purpose) or sometimes even no specific name. In the aftermath of World War II, the courts established by British and U.S. occupying powers in Germany applied the doctrine in the trials against German Nazis. The Italian Supreme Court applied a similar doctrine in the trials of Italian fascists.
Special reference can be made to the Georg Otto Sandrock et al. case (also known as the Almelo Trial). There a British court found that three Germans who had killed a British prisoner of war were guilty under the doctrine of "common enterprise". It was clear that they all had had the intention of killing the British soldier, although each of them played a different role. They therefore were all co-perpetrators of the crime of murder. Possibly, the most well known Italian and German post World War II cases are the so called "concentration camp" cases. Two examples of these are the Dachau Concentration Camp case, decided by a United States court and the Belsen case, decided by a British military court, both sitting in Germany. In these cases the accused held some position of authority within the hierarchy of the concentration camps and based on that were found guilty of the charges that they had acted in pursuance of a common plan to kill or mistreat prisoners and hence to commit war crimes. Finally, the case that demonstrates the closest link to the notion of JCE is the Essen Lynching case (also called Essen West), before a British military court. In that case three British prisoners of war had been lynched by a mob of Germans in the town of EssenWest on 13 December 1944. Seven persons (two servicemen and five civilians) were charged with committing a war crime in that they were involved in the killing of the three prisoners of war. They included a German captain, who had placed the three British airmen under the escort of a German soldier who was to take the prisoners to a Luftwaffe unit for interrogation. While the escort with the prisoners was leaving, the captain had ordered that the escort should not interfere if German civilians should molest the prisoners. This order had been given to the escort from the steps of the barracks in a loud voice so that the crowd, which had gathered, could hear and would know exactly what was going to take place. When the prisoners of war were marched through one of the main streets of Essen, the crowd around grew bigger, started hitting them and throwing sticks and stones at them. When they reached the bridge, the airmen were eventually thrown over the parapet of the bridge; one of the airmen was killed by the fall; the others were not dead when they landed, but were killed by shots from the bridge and by members of the crowd who beat and kicked them to death.
Out of the seven charged, five were found guilty: the German captain, the soldier escorting the airmen and three civilians "were found guilty [of murder] because every one of them had in one form or another taken part in the ill-treatment which eventually led to the death of the victims, though against none of the accused had it been exactly proved that they had individually shot or given the blows which caused the death".
show that their legal views might not be that different after all. Despite the lack of universally acceptance of the term "Joint Criminal Enterprise", both legal instruments are consistent with the view that it is a mode of liability well-established in international law and is distinct from aiding and abetting.
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 52/164 of 15 December 1997) upholds the notion of a "common criminal purpose" as distinct from that of aiding and abetting and reads (Article 2(3)(c)) that offences envisaged in the Convention may be committed by any person who "[i]n any other way (other than personally committing or attempting, participating as an accomplice, or organizing or directing others to commit an offence) contributes to the commission of one or more offences …by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned." . The Statute of the ICTY, in Article 7(1) defines the forms of criminal liability and reads that "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime."
As apparent from the wording of Article 7(1), such responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law is not limited merely to those who actually carry out the actus reus of the enumerated crimes but also extends to other offenders who took part in ordering, incitement, attempt and complicity.
JCE does not explicitly appear in Article 7(1) or any other article in the Statute of the ICTY 7 . Despite this, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in its Decision of July 15, 1999, in the Tadic case provided the opinio iuris that participation in the joint criminal enterprise is included in the Statute as a form of "commission" under Article 7(1) of the Statute. Namely, the Appeals Chamber has adopted a broad interpretation that all those who have engaged in serious violations of international humanitarian law, whatever the manner of participation in the perpetration of those violations, must be brought to justice. According to this Decision, JCE allows a court to hold criminally liable, subject to certain conditions, anyone who contributes to the commission of crimes by a group of persons or some members of a group, in the execution of a common criminal plan. This interpretation is not only determined by the object and purpose of the Statute but also by the very nature of many international crimes which are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design.
Under these circumstances, to hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person who materially performs the criminal act (physically perpetrates the criminal act of murder, extermination, etc.) would disregard the role as co-perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for the perpetrator to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, depending upon the circumstances, to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of their criminal responsibility.
This understanding of participation in JCE follows the principle that the moral gravity of such participation is no different -from that of those actually carrying out the acts in question.
Three categories of Joint Criminal Enterprise cases
There are three distinct categories of JCE liability in war crime cases.
"The first such category is represented by cases where all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a plan among the co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within it), they nevertheless all possess the intent to kill"

.
The objective and subjective prerequisites for imputing criminal responsibility to a participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have, effected the killing are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the common design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by providing material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting the killing, must nevertheless intend this result.
2. The "concentration camp" cases are the second category of cases and are in many respects similar to that set forth above. This notion of common purpose was applied to instances where the offences charged were alleged to have been committed by members of military or administrative units such as those running concentration camps; i.e., by groups of persons acting pursuant to a concerted plan.
This category of cases is really a variant of the first category. Cases illustrative of this category are the Dachau Concentration Camp Case, decided by a United States court sitting in Germany and the Belsen Case, decided by a British military court sitting in Germany. In these cases the accused held some position of authority within the hierarchy of the concentration camps. Generally speaking, the charges against them were that they had acted in pursuance of a common design to kill or mistreat prisoners and hence to commit war crimes. In his summing up in the Belsen case, the Judge Advocate adopted the three requirements identified by the Prosecution as necessary to establish guilt in each case: (i) the existence of an organized system to ill-treat the detainees and commit the various crimes alleged; (ii) the accused's awareness of the nature of the system; and (iii) the fact that the accused in some way actively participated in enforcing the system. The convictions of several of the accused appear to have been based explicitly upon these criteria.
3. The third category concerns cases involving a common design where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common design, is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the implementation of that common purpose.
An example of this would be a common, shared intention on the part of a group to forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (in other words to effect "ethnic cleansing") with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is killed. While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common design, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one or more of those civilians. Criminal responsibility may be imputed to all participants within the common enterprise where the risk of death occurring was both a predictable consequence of the execution of the common design and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk. The case law in this category concerned first of all cases of mob violence, that is situations of disorder where multiple offenders act out a common purpose, where each of them commit offences against the victim but where it is unknown or impossible to ascertain exactly which acts were carried out by which perpetrator, or when the causal link between each act and the eventual harm caused to the victims is similarly indeterminate 9 .
Elements of Joint Criminal Enterprise as defined by ICTY
Despite the fact that ICTY's Statute does not specify an actus reus and mens rea of JCE, the first explicit definition of this form of liability and its constituent elements was provided in the ICTY's Appeals Chamber Decision in Tadic case of 1999. Since then, it has not undergone any significant changes in the subsequent jurisprudence.
The actus reus of JCE comprises the simultaneous existence of the three following elements:
1. A plurality of persons. They need not be organized in a military, political or administrative structure.
2. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. There is no necessity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated. The common plan or purpose may materialize ad hoc.
3. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not involve commission of a specific crime under one of those provisions (for example, murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or purpose.
Unlike the actus reus, the mens rea differs according to the category of JCE applied:
1. The first category of cases requires the intent to perpetrate a specific crime (this intent being shared by all the co-perpetrators).
the accused willingly took that risk.
In Vasiljevic case, the ICTY trial chamber concluded that: "A person participates in a joint criminal enterprise by personally committing the agreed crime as a principal offender, or by assisting the principal offender in committing the agreed crime as a coperpetrator (by undertaking acts that facilitate the commission of the offence by the principal offender), or by acting in furtherance of a particular system in which the crime is committed by reason of the accused's position of authority or function, and with knowledge of the nature of that system and intent to further that system.
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" Further, if the agreed crime is committed by one or other of the participants in a joint criminal enterprise, all of the participants in that enterprise are equally guilty of the crime regardless of the part played by each in its commission.
Distinction between acting in Joint Criminal Enterprise and aiding and abetting
In practice aiding and abetting might be easily confused with JCE, thus it is important to bear in mind the key differences between these.
The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, the principal. Under JCE liability each participant in the JCE is a principal perpetrator himself.
The cases of aiding and abetting require no proof of the existence of a common concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan. No plan or agreement is required: indeed, the principal may not even know about the accomplice's contribution. By contrast to the JCE, the existence of a common plan, design or purpose is considered to be sine qua non.
The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. By contrast, in the case of JCE, it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose. One should remember that in the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the principal. By contrast, in the case of JCE, more is required (i.e., either intent to perpetrate the crime or intent to pursue the common criminal design plus foresight that those crimes outside the criminal common purpose were likely to be committed).
Finally, it is interesting to underline when an aider or abettor becomes a co-perpetrator. The trial Chamber in Kvocka case, held that an aider or abettor, one who assists or facilitates the criminal enterprise as an accomplice, may become a co-perpetrator, even without physically committing crimes, if their participation lasts for an extensive period or becomes more directly involved in maintaining the functioning of the enterprise. By sharing the intent of the joint criminal enterprise, the aider or abettor becomes a coperpetrator. Furthermore, when an accused participates in a crime that advances the goals of the criminal enterprise, it is often reasonable to hold that her form of involvement in the enterprise has graduated to that of a co-perpetrator. Finally, once the evidence indicates that a person who substantially assists the enterprise shares the goals of the enterprise, he becomes a co-perpetrator 11 .
Concluding remarks
Despite the numerous objections to validity of the JCE mode of liability (such as that "implicit" criminal liability is unacceptable in contemporary criminal law and human rights law; that JCE theory has been used selectively; that the notion is quite vague and unclear with infinite possibilities for unlimited interpretations and abuses; the third -"extended" form of JCE is conviction without guilt; etc.), it is difficult not to observe the significant benefits of its use in war crime proceedings at international as well as national levels.
JCE is a victim-centered, far-reaching theory often used to prosecute the senior leadership 12 as well as low-level individual perpetrators responsible for a broad range of crimes perpetrated in the names of former leaders. For example, there are significant benefits to its use in its expansive version (e.g.) when an international court uses the doctrine to hold a particular defendant liable for the range of crimes associated with regional ethnic cleansing in which he played some part.
At the same time, this doctrine can be abused if used by a dishonest national government to suggest that all persons who provide any sort of support to a terrorist organization, however loosely defined, become liable for all crimes committed by its members. Stated differently, the uncontrolled use of joint criminal enterprise can pose serious dangers to the fairness of the proceedings.
In practice, JCE represents a transfer of power from international judges to prosecutors, who have enormous discretion to decide how much wrongdoing to assign to any particular defendant. Because the doctrine is so loose, JCE closely approaches a theory of guilt by association. When used properly, JCE can assist in connecting participants in a criminal enterprise who operated far from the crime scene. When used selectively this notion represents the infinite possibilities for unlimited interpretations and abuses.
Finally, BiH legal practitioners will probably have to decide if a newly emerged liability doctrine that has been playing a central role in the allocation of guilt in international criminal tribunals would be accepted to have a similar role in cases before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Judging from the current jurisprudence, this option is highly unlikely. July 15, 1999, para. 195-196, 202-204 9 For further details regarding these three categories, see Tadi 12 The Miloševi case featuring three indictments that charge him with participating in three massive separate JCEs to remove non-Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, respectively, is a particularly leading example of how JCE may be used to reach high-level perpetrators.
Udruženi zlo ina ki poduhvat
Novi oblik krivi ne odgovornosti, lanak Jasmine Pjani , pravnice u OKO-u
Uvodne napomene
Savremeno me unarodno krivi no pravo u posljednje vrijeme zna ajno se bavi pitanjem individualne odgovornosti pojedinaca za zlo ine masovnih razmjera. Imaju i u vidu da ovakvi zlo ini obi no podrazumijevaju zna ajno u eš e ve eg broja pojedinaca, utvr ivanje udjela odgovornosti svakog od njih od klju ne je važnosti. Ovaj lanak bavi se upravo udruženim zlo ina kim poduhvatom kao novonastalom doktrinom odgovornosti koja igra središnju ulogu u utvr ivanju krivnje pred me unarodnim krivi nim sudovima, a koja bi mogla imati sli nu ulogu i u predmetima pred Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine. Udruženi zlo ina ki poduhvat (u daljem tekstu: UZP) je teorija odgovornosti koju su u najve oj mjeri razradili tužitelji, branitelji i suci Me unarodnog krivi nog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (u daljem tekstu: MKSJ). Premda UZP ima nekoliko modaliteta, suština svih je da tužilaštvo dokazuje: da je grupa ljudi imala zajedni ki plan, namjeru ili cilj da po ini zlo in, da je optuženi na neki na in u estvovao u tom planu i da je optuženi imao u namjeri ostvarenje cilja tog zajedni kog plana. Ako tužilaštvo uspije dokazati kumulativno postojanje ovih elemenata, optuženi može biti osu en za sve po injene zlo ine u okviru zajedni kog plana, kao i za sve zlo ine koje nije namjeravao, ali koji su bili predvidljiva posljedica zajedni kog plana.
Mada s jedne strane skorija praksa MKSJ-a pokazuje jaku sklonost primjeni ovog oblika individualne odgovornosti 1 , ini se da u procesuiranju ratnih zlo ina doma i sudovi u velikoj mjeri kritikuju njegovo usvajanje i primjenu ocjenjuju i ga dosta neodre enim, nejasanim, otvorenim za razna tuma enja i kao takvim predodre enim za razne zloupotrebe.
Postoje mnogi argumenti za i protiv UZP-a. Cilj ovog lanka nije da se prednost daje bilo kojem od ovih argumenata, ve da itaocu pruži osnovne informacije o njegovim historijskim korjenima, klju nim elementima i modalitetima koje je razvila praksa MKSJa, kao i dilemama u vezi sa njegovom konkretnom primjenom.
Historijski razvoj udruženog zlo ina kog poduhvata
Tokom njegovog kratkog formalnog postojanja 2 , razni pravni forumi 3 primijenili su ovaj oblik odgovornosti i svi oni dijele jedan zna ajan princip: svaki se oslanja -barem dijelom -na me unarodno krivi no pravo kao izvor materijalnog prava. Dok su enja pred doma im sudovima tako e uklju uju i optužbe koje se zasnivaju na doma em krivi nom zakonodavstvu, svi glavni ad hoc tribunali bave se, u okviru svoje nadležnosti, zlo inima i institutima koji vode porijeklo isklju ivo iz me unarodnog obi ajnog prava i posljedi no iz njegovih kodifikacija.
Savremeno me unarodno krivi no pravo je kompleksan korpus prava nastao iz krivi ne prakse kontinentalnih i anglosaksonskih pravnih sistema, pod snažnim utjecajem prava ljudskih prava i što je najvažnije, doma ih krivi nih zakonodavstava. Pri tom, doma a krivi na zakonodavstva redovno polaze od individualnog po injenja kažnjivog djela kao neophodnog preduslova za postojanje krivi ne odgovornosti, a nacionalni pravni sistemi ovaj princip definišu Ustavom, zakonima ili/i sudskim odlukama. Sli no tome, me unarodno krivi no sudovanje naglašava ovaj princip individualne, li ne vinosti nasuprot pojma kolektivne krivice i ponavlja da se «niko ne može smatrati krivi no odgovorim za djela ili poduhvate u kojima nije bio li no angažovan ili na neki drugi na in u estvovao (nulla poena sine culpa) 3 ». S obzirom na ovaj zajedni ki princip, mnogi zastupaju stav da pojam zajedni kog cilja, koji je potvr en u me unarodnom krivi nom pravu, ima svoju osnovu u mnogim nacionalnim sistemima 4 . a) Sudska praksa nakon II svjetskog rata: Prvi pomen UZP-a u me unarodnom obi ajnom ratnom pravu poti e iz predmeta nakon II svjetskog rata, u kojima se ova doktrina koristila pod razli itim nazivima (zajedni ki cilj) ili ponekad ak bez odre enog naziva. U postratnom periodu, sudovi koje su uspostavile britanske i ameri ke okupacione snage u Njema koj, primijenile su ovu doktrinu na su enjima protiv njema kih nacista. Italijanski Vrhovni sud primijenio je sli nu doktrinu na su enjima italijanskim fašistima.
Posebno se može pomenuti predmet Georg Otto Sandrock et al. (tako e poznat kao «Su enje Almelo»; Almelo Trial). U tom predmetu, britanski sud primjenjuju i doktrinu «zajedni kog poduhvata», proglasio je trojicu Nijemca krivima, jer su ubili britanskog ratnog zarobljenika. U predmetu je dokazano da su sva trojica po inilaca imala namjeru da ubiju britanskog vojnika, iako je svaki od njih imao druga iju ulogu u izvršenju. Stoga su svi oni bili saizvršioci u zlo inu ubistva.
Vjerovatno najpoznatiji italijanski i njema ki predmeti nakon II svjetskog rata su tzv. predmeti «koncentracionih logora». Dva takva primjera su predmet «Koncentracionog logora Dahau» (Dachau Concentration Camp), po kojem je odlu ivao ameri ki sud i predmet «Belsen» (Belsen) po kojem je odlu ivao britanski vojni sud. Oba suda su zasjedala u Njema koj. U ovim predmetima, optuženi su imali izvjestan položaj u upravnoj hijerarhiji koncentracionih logora i na osnovu toga proglašeni krivim po optužbama da su djelovali u izvršenju zajedni kog plana da se ubiju ili maltretiraju zarobljenici, i da su stoga po inili ratni zlo ini. Na kraju, predmet koji prikazuje najbližu vezu sa suvremenim pojmom UZP-a je predmet «Lin ovanje u Esenu» (Essen Lynching) (koji se tako e naziva i «Zapadni Esen»; Essen West), vo en pred britanskim vojnim sudom. U ovom predmetu, skupina Nijemaca je lin ovala tri britanska ratna zarobljenika u gradu Esen-Vestu 13. decembra 1944. Sedam osoba (dva vojna lica i pet civila) optuženo je da su po inili ratni zlo in jer su u estvovali u ubistvu tri ratna zarobljenika. Jedan od optuženih bio je i njema ki kapetan, koji je tri britanska vazduhoplovca stavio pod pratnju jednog njema kog vojnika, koji je trebao da ih odvede do jedinice Luftvafe radi saslušanja. Dok je pratnja sa zarobljenicima odlazila, kapetan je naredio pratnji da se ne suprotstavlja ako njema ki civili, gra ani budu zlostavljali zarobljenike. Nare enje je pratnji dato glasno sa stepenica kasarne tako da je gomila, koja se okupila, mogla jasno da uje i zna njeno zna enje. Dok su zarobljenici sprovo eni jednom od glavnih ulica u Esenu, gomila oko njih je rasla, te je po ela da ih udara i ga a štapovima i kamenjem. Naposljetku, kada su došli do mosta, vazduhoploci su ba eni preko njegove ograde; jedan od vazduhoplovaca poginuo je od pada; drugu dvojicu koji su preživjeli pad usmrtili su hici sa mosta i gomila koja ih je na smrt pretukla.
Petorica od sedam optuženih: njema ki kapetan, vojnik koji je bio u pratnji vazduhoplovaca i tri civila «su proglašena krivim (za ubistvo) jer je svaki od njih na jedan ili drugi na in u estvovao u maltretiranju koje je na kraju dovelo do smrti žrtava, mada nije ta no dokazano da je ijedan od optuženih pojedina no pucao ili zadavao udarce koji su prouzrokovali smrt.» Što se ti e predmeta UZP-a koji nisu u vezi sa II svjetskim ratom, Žalbeno vije e MKSJa u predmetu Tadi u presudi je navelo brojne odluke italijanskih sudova od šezdesetih do devetesetih godina, odluke Francuskog kasacionog suda od 1947 do 1984, kao i jurisprudenciju u Engleskoj, Velsu, Kanadi, SAD-u, Australiji i Zambiji. b) Me unarodni instrumenti: Pored sudske prakse, pojam UZP-a definiraju i dva me unarodna pravna instrumenta. Oba instrumenta izražavaju pravni stav, tj. opinio iuris velikog broja država potpisnica i pokazuju da se njihova pravni stavovi, na posljetku i ne razlikuju u tolikoj mjeri. Uprkos odsustvu univerzalnog prihvatanja termina «udruženi zlo ina ki poduhvat», oba pravna instrumenta konzistentna su sa mišljenjem da je to vrsta odgovornosti koja je vrsto utemeljena u me unarodnom pravu i koja se razlikuje od pomaganja i podržavanja.
Me unarodna konvencija o suzbijanju teroristi kih bombaških napada (koju je usvojila Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija, Rezolucija 52/164, 15. decembra 1997.; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) utvr uje «zajedni ki zlo ina ki cilj» kao pojam koji se razlikuje od pomaganja i podržavanja, i navodi ( lan 2(3)(c)) da krivi na djela koja predvi a Konvencija može po initi svaka osoba koja «(i) na bilo koji drugi na in (pored li nog izvršenja ili pokušaja izvršenja, u eš a kao sau esnik, ili organiziranja ili upu ivanja drugih da po ine krivi no djelo) doprinese izvršenju jednog ili više krivi nih djela ....iza kojeg stoji grupa lica koja djeluje sa zajedni kim ciljem; takav doprinos mora biti namjeran i u injen sa ciljem omogu avanja daljeg izvršenja op e krivi ne djelatnosti ili ostvarivanja cilja grupe, ili u injen sa znanjem o namjeri grupe da po ini doti no krivi no djelo/djela.» Statut Me unarodnog krivi nog suda, kojeg je usvojila Diplomatska konferencija u Rimu 17. jula 1998, («Rimski statut»), utvr uje ovu doktrinu u lanu 25, stav 3(d), koji kaže:
«U skladu sa ovim Statutom, svako je krivi no odgovoran i bi e kažnjen za krivi no djelo iz nadležnosti Suda ukoliko to lice.... (d) Na bilo koji drugi na in (pored pomaganja i podržavanja ili potpomaganja na drugi na in u izvršavanju ili pokušaju izvršenja zlo ina) doprinese izvršenju ili pokušaju izvršenja zlo ina iza kojeg stoji grupa lica koja djeluje sa zajedni kim ciljem. Takav doprinos mora biti namjeran i mora biti:
(i) U injen sa ciljem omogu avanja daljeg izvršenja krivi ne djelatnosti ili ostvarivanja kažnjivog cilja te grupe, kada imaju za posljedicu izvršenje zlo ina iz nadležnosti Suda; ili (ii) u injen sa znanjem o namjerama grupe da po ini takav zlo in.» c) Pravna praksa MKSJ-a: Prvo zvani no priznanje UZP-a kao teorije odgovornosti može se na i u pravnoj praksi MKSJ-a i znamenitoj presudi žalbenog vije a u predmetu Tadi   6 . Statut MKSJ-a u lanu 7(1) definiše oblike krivi ne odgovornosti i kaže da: «Lice koje je planiralo, podsticalo, naredilo, po inilo ili na drugi na in pomoglo i podržalo planiranje, pripremanje ili izvršenje zlo ina iz lanova 2 do 5 ovog Statuta, individualno je odgovorno za taj zlo in.» Kao što je o igledno iz sadržaja lana 7(1), odgovornost za ozbiljna kršenja me unarodnog humanitarnog prava ne ograni ava se samo na one koji zapravo poduzimaju actus reus nabrojanih zlo ina, ve se proteže i na druge po inioce koji su u estvovali u nare ivanju, podsticanju, pokušaju i sau esništvu.
UZP se ne pojavljuje izri ito u lanu 7(1) ili bilo kojem drugom lanu Statuta MKSJ-a 7 . Uprokos tome, u svojoj odluci od 15. jula 1999. u predmetu Tadi , Žalbeno vije e MKSJa dalo je opinio iuris da je u eš e u zajedni kom zlo ina kom poduhvatu ipak obuhva eno kao oblik « injenja» iz lana 7(1) Statuta. Naime, Žalbeno vije e usvojilo je široko tuma enje da svi oni koji su u estvovali u ozbiljnim kršenjima me unarodnog humanitarnog prava, ma kakav bio oblik tog u eš a, moraju biti privedeni pravdi. Prema ovoj odluci, teorija UZP omogu ava sudu da pod odre enim uslovima, drži krivi no odgovornim, svakog ko doprinese izvršenju zlo ina odre ene grupe lica ili nekih lanova
